TOPIC 1, R-1

FORMULATION OF POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES

by

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RESTRICTED
BARNES: It was suggested to me on Sunday that the introductions from this platform are getting perhaps too functional and that there was time for another animal story. Well, I was rather impressed with the idea. Until late last night I was reading a little of the poetry of "Archie the Cockroach", and I came across this: "One thing the human being never seems to get into his head is the fact that humans appear just as unnecessary to cockroaches as cockroaches do to humans." I decided not to tell the story because I thought it applied to introductions.

There are only two things I would like to say before Mr. Acheson is called up here. I would like to recall two facts, two facts that stand out in foreign relations at the present time, or in our relations with Russia, if you will, and in Mr. Acheson's own career. The two facts in foreign relations are: (1) Russia's denunciation of warmongers, and (2) the Marshall Plan. Now Mr. Acheson's relation to these two facts: First, Mr. Acheson was the first outstanding American denounced by Mr. Molotov, and I want to read the last two sentences of Secretary Marshall's reply to that denunciation in his note to Mr. Molotov:

"The conduct of the Under Secretary, therefore, in answering the question frankly" -- that is when he replied to a Senator's request for information about Russia -- "and in accordance with his conscience cannot be described as inadmissible but was rather in the line of duty. You characterized the content of his statement as a rude slander and
hostile to the Soviet Union. Under our standards a restrained comment on a matter of public policy is not a slander. Therefore, I know that on second thought you will not attribute hostility to frankness."

I am very pleased to have this occasion to cite that because I think it is excellent proof of the capacity that does exist, despite the thought to the contrary, in the State Department.

There is another thing with respect to Mr. Acheson and this in connection with the Marshall Plan. On speaking on the eighth of May 1947 -- you will recall that Mr. Marshall's speech I believe was June fifth, the Harvard speech -- Mr. Acheson speaking on May eighth: "Until the various countries of the world get on their feet and become self-supporting there can be no political or economic stability in the world and no lasting peace or prosperity for any of us."

I think these two facts make it very clear that Mr. Acheson is a very appropriate speaker for the War College this morning. Mr. Acheson.

MR. ACHESON: Mr. Barnes, Admiral Hill, gentlemen: The warmth of your welcome to me this morning led me to believe you have not read and pondered upon that statement which is printed in all Pullman cars which says, "Quiet is requested for the benefit of those who have retired." I must say that one can wonder about the completeness of my retirement. I have been looking forward, as I told General Vandegrift this morning, to a period of complete relaxation when I left the State Department. I don't think I have ever worked any harder in the Department than I have outside.

First of all, the President put me on the Permanent Joint
Board on Defense and sent me to Canada. I had hardly recovered from that when he put me on the Hoover Commission to reorganize the Federal Government, which seemed quite a handful for anybody. Then Mr. Lovett decided the proper division of labor was for the State Department to do things, and for me to get on a train and go all over the United States and explain it, which I have had to do. But I find it easier to explain what somebody else has done than what I have done myself.

I was thinking the other day about that story from "Green Pastures," where Joseph was brought up before Pharaoh who said, "I understand you are pretty good at tricks." Joseph said, yes, he was good, and he took his little stick and turned it into a serpent, and he did several other things. Pharaoh said, "You are fine." Joseph said, "I can do something better than that." Pharaoh said, "What is that?" Joseph said, "I can tell you what you are going to do before you do it." Pharaoh said, "If you can do that, you can do more than I can."

In one sense, that is what is likely to happen to you this morning in this address. What I shall try to do is lay before you some of the underlying factors which go into the formulation of foreign policy, factors which have nothing to do with the foreign question itself, but factors which are a conditioning element, a limiting element upon those who have the task of formulating foreign policy, whether it be in the State Department or the service departments or the Congress or wherever it may be.

There is a sort of happy idea among columnists that in looking at the world we have unlimited choice, and that we can decide that we will do anything which seems to us to be good in relation to any foreign
problem. So complete is that attitude of mind that some distinguished columnists decide they will do opposite things on succeeding days. You recall that one very distinguished columnist in this country wrote at some length articles replying to an article attributed to a former assistant director of this school, in which the columnist pointed out we could not win the cold war, that it was hopeless and we shouldn't engage in such an activity at all. He then went to Europe, and when he came back, and before his articles had appeared in book form, he reported we had won the cold war. That confused many people, including a gentleman who wrote a letter to the Washington Post mentioning the name of this columnist and pointing out these apparently contradicting conclusions. He said, "What I want to know: Is he at war or at peace? Is he winning or losing?"

There are limiting factors, notwithstanding columnists, which make it impossible to do in some periods of time what it is possible to do in other periods of time. I thought this morning we might run through some of those and see what their broad bearing is upon the formulation of foreign policy. If this seems to you to end in more confusion than light, you will be in the position of Sir Willmott Lewis, who, looking at the world the other day, said, "We have chaos but not enough to make a world."

One group of limiting factors on the formulation of foreign policy are what we might call historic attitudes of mind in the United States, a sort of national mental conditioning. These are deep-seated convictions or attitudes which over years have been ingrained in the American People, and which cannot be cast aside no matter how brilliantly those in charge of foreign policy may present their proposals.

Let's have a few illustrations of those. One is the whole
series of doctrines, beliefs and attitudes which you can sum up under the Monroe Doctrine or the good neighbor policy. That is an attitude toward a part of the world. It is a deeply ingrained attitude in America. It is an attitude which is tough and which will not yield to more recent attitudes. An interesting example of how that attitude may come in conflict with a newer one occurred at San Francisco when the United Nations charter was under consideration. The charter, as originally drafted at Dumbarton Oaks, provided for United Nations action through the Security Council in disputes anywhere in the world. As the discussion went on that newer attitude of a world organization which would have supreme authority to preserve peace in all parts of the world came in conflict with this older and tougher attitude, and out of that conflict there developed Articles 51 and 52 of the charter, having to do with regional self-defense. Those articles were put in there not to carry out general principles, but as a recognition of the special relationships in the Western Hemisphere.

The fact that they are put in general terms is another rather interesting thing that we might note in passing. Whenever people want to accomplish something quite specific they like to put it in a broad setting. One of the interesting examples of that is the Magna Charta. The Magna Charta was not regarded when it was written as we think of it today. It was not written as a statement of the rights of the common man. The Magna Charta had a very specific purpose. It was written to protect and continue the rights of the feudal nobles. You take one of the phrases which now is a household phrase in America, that a man is entitled to be tried by a jury of his peers. Did that mean every man
had the right to a fair trial? That isn't what the Magna Charta meant at all. It meant if you were a noble you were tried by the nobles and not by the King's court. And that persists today. If a member of the House of Lords has a traffic accident, he is not tried in the police court but in the House of Lords. That is an aside, but it is to illustrate that here is a historic attitude of the United States and of the other countries in the Western Hemisphere toward their cooperation which made certain hemisphere situations not subject in the first instance, at least, to the broad scope of the United Nations charter.

And again it is interesting to see that those general phrases are being picked up by writers now who are baffled by what to do with the United Nations in view of the Russian recalcitrance. They are saying that, perhaps, we can expand those articles now so that along with the United Nations charter there can be separate agreements among all of those countries who are willing to go forward in carrying out the principles of the United Nations by military action, if necessary, without the veto. So there was an attitude of mind, an historic attitude on the part of the United States, which is a limiting factor. It is not possible to write the kind of United Nations charter that was thought of first at Dumbarton Oaks without making a concession to that attitude of mind.

We have another historic attitude on the part of Americans toward another part of the world -- China. For years, ever since the Clipper ship days, Americans have had a special interest in China. This has been formulated in many ways. At one time the formulation took the form of the open door policy, which, as you first read it, looks as though we were saying if there is going to be any exploitation
going on we want to be in on the ground floor. But that is not the underlying attitude of the open door policy. It was stated in that way, but what was really underneath it and behind it was a deep-seated conviction that the domination of China by any foreign power was hostile to the interests of the United States, and therefore we were not going to stand back. If other powers had interests in China we had ours too.

Then as the years went on that doctrine became an even broader one, and approached much more clearly the statement that domination of China by any foreign power will not be accepted by the United States. And it was that attitude of mind which underlines the whole 1930's. When the Japanese were going into China, our government, as you remember, made one or two efforts to have the British and others go along with us in taking action to prevent it. When that became impossible it was of necessity the official attitude that we were not taking any part in this struggle. That wasn't the attitude of the American people, and all through the 30's they objected to the shipping of scrap and petroleum to Japan. A great undercurrent of popular resentment grew up against the policies of the government, and modified the policies of the government.

There are several other -- I will mention one or two -- historic attitudes of mind which limit or condition foreign policy. One is the sanctity of the internal affairs of a country. That is very deeply ingrained in Americans. In all our treaties we exempt from the World Court or any other form of international arbitration or decision such matters as immigration and tariffs and things of that sort which undoubtedly have very great effects on other nations. But we say these are the internal affairs of the United States and we do not permit them to be discussed
or passed upon.

That attitude has had very interesting consequences. During the early days of the Nazi power in Germany, it was thought all through the United States that as much as we disliked what was going on in Germany, as much as we disliked the persecution of Jews or the growth of arbitrary power, this was something for the Germans to decide, this was an internal German matter. And it was only as the years went along that we began to see that that wasn't true, that developments in Germany had very great effects in the outside world. So we had sort of a split personality. Part of our historic attitude was this was internal, this was a matter for the Germans to decide. The more realistic part of our mind said that could not be true. But we were confused as to what the right answer was.

This happened even more recently in regard to communism. I remember when it was accepted doctrine to say in the United States, "We don't care if another country wants to be communist, that is all right, that is an internal matter, that is a matter for them to decide." It was only as we had more and more experience with communism that we learned it was not a doctrine which people picked up and looked over and either adopted or rejected. It was an instrument of Russian foreign policy. I learned that the communist parties in Salvador, or Mexico, or Italy, or France, or the United States, or wherever they were, were not ideological parties. They were not merely radical parties. They were not merely people who had little more leftish ideas than the socialists. They were Russian parties. They were people who were getting their party line from another country, and whose party line was directed toward furthering the interest of that particular other country. As that came
home to us we began to see it wasn't true that it was no concern of ours whether the Greeks, the Italians or some other people were communists or not, because those people were not having a choice about it. They were being coerced either by an internal organization financed by other countries, or by external pressure to adopt a system of government which had the inescapable consequence of inclusion in the system of the Russian power.

So again we had an internal conflict of mind, and we had to adjust ourselves to a new idea that it is very difficult not to talk about internal affairs of a country. We had this same difficulty when we went into Greece. One of the reasons for going in is the one I said, that other people were coercing the Greeks in regard to their internal situation. As soon as we went in and helped the Greeks it became perfectly clear as a result of the greatly upset condition of that country, which had gone on for many years before the last war, that it was necessary to interfere in their internal affairs in order to get them straightened out. It was necessary to see that the civil service was straightened out and made competent. It was necessary to revise the tax structure. It was necessary to have import and export controls and exchange controls. All of those matters, which were purely internal Greek matters, had to be affected by the American mission, and the American mission had to get in there and pitch very hard on these internal things.

Another thing we might mention is our historic attitude toward propaganda. We are against propaganda. Now that attitude of mind has made it very, very difficult for people who are working in the State Department to tell the story of the United States abroad. There seemed to be something slightly disreputable about it. The Congress has been
critical of it. It has been extremely difficult to get the money and the organization for the purpose of telling the truth abroad because the general historic attitude of mind in the United States is against what we describe as propaganda.

Another thing which relates to the same subject is our deep conviction that private activities are better than governmental activities. People on the Hill will come and tell you, "Why don't you turn this over to NBC or CBS or this world station in Boston. Why don't you let private people do it?" There are many reasons why that isn't successful. It is only necessary to mention one that General Smith talked to the Congressional leaders about when he was here. He said, surely this is the way you think in the United States. You think that private activity is better. But certainly in this field and in many others that isn't the attitude of mind of many peoples in Europe and of all the people on the other side of the iron curtain. General Smith said the Voice of America, if it is put out by the government of the United States, will be believed by everybody who hears it except insofar as it comes in direct conflict with the Soviet radio or the Bulgarian radio. But it almost never does. What it does is to tell all that part of the story which the other official radios have suppressed. The people are quite aware that that is going on. They know their government doesn't tell them the whole truth. When the United States government says it is true Mr. Vishinsky made this speech which is reported in all Europe, but in reply to that Mr. Marshall, Mr. Bevin and Mr. Bismarck said all these things, they don't doubt that. But they do doubt it if CBS or NBC tells them that. That isn't official. That is
private capitalism. It is something they are not familiar with. But if the government of the United States gives the other side, it is listened to. So our attitude of mind toward government in business contributed to the difficulty of making the Voice of America effective.

There are others I could go into, but which I will skip this morning, such as the whole background of economic policies which have grown up during the period when the United States was a debtor country. Those are deeply ingrained in Americans, and yet they are completely inapplicable to the United States as the greatest creditor country in the world.

So that is one group of limiting factors — historic attitudes of mind.

You have another group of limiting factors which are even more tremendous in their impact at a particular period. I can describe those by saying that they have to do with the national mood at any given time. We are a nation much given to moods. They are very deep moods. They last for quite a long period, sometimes twenty years. When we are in one of those moods it conditions and limits everything which the leaders of this country are doing. Let's take two or three of them and illustrate a bit.

The first one is what I call the second period of manifest destiny, that period in American history from 1891 or 1892 to 1910. That was the period of the emergence of the United States as a world power. It was the period when people had big ideas. Theodore Roosevelt was full of vigor. The American people liked that vigor. We had great men like Secretary Root and Secretary Taft in the Cabinet. We had Taft, Leonard
Mood and others going to the Philippines, and others to Cuba and Porto Rico. There was practically no part of the world in which we were not interested, and there was nothing which seemed to us impossible. We were confident, we were vigorous, we were sure of ourselves. And that was the mood of manifest destiny.

Then you have another mood period, almost the exact opposite, the period of the 20's and 30's, the period which starts with Harding and Coolidge and runs through Mr. Hoover and well into President Franklin Roosevelt's administration. This was the period of prohibition, of boom and bust. I can describe it frivolously by paraphrasing another phrase in American history and say it was the period of rum, rheumatism and the hellion. During this period we were tremendously introspective. First of all we had prohibition. Nobody who hasn't lived through that period can fully understand the semi-presence of liquor in peoples' minds. It is like having a pebble in your shoe. The pebble is minute but it makes you utterly miserable and you can't think of anything else until you get the pebble out.

Everybody in the United States was talking with everybody else about how they got their liquor. Did they make gin, did they buy gin? Did they get Maryland rye or some other kind of rye? Was it true you had to rock whiskey in a barrel or was it not? This absorbed the mind of the country. It did all kinds of things to our social institutions. Prohibition ruined the club and the saloon which were finer institutions, and brought drinking into the home where drinking isn't in its best atmosphere. It had very deep-seated effects on our whole mental attitude.

Then while that was going on we were making tremendous sums of
money in the United States. The last part of the 20's was a period when everybody was getting rich except the farmers, who were getting poor, and no one paid any attention to them. This period of prosperity and luxury gave us a rather romantic view of how dreadful an accident we were. Scott Fitzgerald wrote books in which nobody was sober from page one until they committed suicide on the last page, and we said, "How sad but how true. We are all like that."

Then we had the great depression and everybody lost all the money they made before, and that upset them very much. I have been frivolous in describing this period, but it is an important national mood period. And it was during the period of that mood when we were utterly concerned with our own affairs and our own politics, when people were so upset about the President of the United States during Mr. Roosevelt's administration that some people were saying, "I will go and live in France and I will become a French citizen and I won't come back here until somebody else is president," and other people were saying, "This is the greatest man who has ever lived in the United States." These absorptions in our own domestic affairs were going on at the time the Italians went into Ethiopia, the Japanese went into Manchuria and Shanghai, the Germans went into the Rhineland. All of this was happening, something which would have been resented at once and acted upon in this earlier period of manifest destiny, but something with which in the second period we were not concerned. The great issues then were issues of domestic policy in the United States. That was a period of introspection and somewhat of futility.

What I want to point out is that the very same statesmen, making the same proposals in one period would be regarded as heroes, and in the
other period they would be howled down as a wildman, just as Franklin Roosevelt was when he made his Quarantine Speech in Chicago in 1937.

Then we have the more recent mood periods. A very short one was in '45 and '46 after V-J day when there seemed to be one absorbing idea in the United States which was to bring every soldier and sailor and airman we had in the world home and demobilize him, destroy our armed forces, and say that every problem in the world would be handled by the United Nations. That was escapism of a very rare and dangerous form. We had been through the period of the war in which the United States had both power and idealism, and in the latter part of '45 and '46 we kept the idealism and destroyed the power. There is nothing worse a nation can do for itself than that.

We are in a period now I think of the formulation of a mood. Again we have great absorption in our domestic problems. Whether you can get the icebox or not is an important thing, whether the new cars are or are not any good, whether you are on the list to get one, at the top or the bottom. Those ideas take the most time and thought. I have been over the country in the last two weeks speaking from San Francisco to Portland to Spokane to Minneapolis to Duluth to Chicago, the whole northwestern part of the country. And it seems to me I can see very clearly the formulation of a new mood. The country is getting serious; it is getting impressed by the fact that this business of dealing with the Russians is a long, long job. People don't say any more why doesn't Mr. Truman get together with Uncle Joe Stalin and fix it up? That used to be a common idea. There is less and less talk even among silly people about dropping bombs on Moscow. They now see it is a long, long
pull, and that it can only be done by the United States getting itself together, determining that we cannot maintain a counter-balance to the communist power without strengthening all those other parts of the world which belong in the system with us. That takes money, imagination, American skill and American technical help and many, many years.

That mood is growing. It isn't the mood of the country yet, but it is growing, and I have great hope that we are not going to slide back into another period like the 20's and 30's when we became utterly absorbed with our own problems, but that we are going to understand that our functions in the world will require all of the power and all the thought and all the calmness we have at our disposal.

We have another group of limiting factors, and those may be described as entrenched domestic policies. We have talked about the historic attitudes of mind, we have talked about the mood of the country in any particular time. Now there are another group of factors, and these are entrenched domestic policies. Let me give you one or two illustrations of that.

Perhaps the most firmly held policy at the present time in our domestic politics is the maintenance of agricultural prices. That was something which started before the Roosevelt administration with the McNary-Haugen bill. It was supported by a tremendously effective lobby of farm groups on the Hill. It appeals to a part of the country whose vote determines which way elections shall go, and it is a very deeply held policy. If people in the part of our government which is dealing with foreign affairs don't understand that, they can, and they have, caused great trouble for themselves and everyone else. If you start, as we did several times, on a foreign economic policy which tends to break down all barriers to
trade — I don't mean free trade but greatly reduce all barriers to trade — and if you come into a period where there is great agricultural production, what immediately happens, of course, is that you have a level of agricultural prices in the United States infinitely higher than prices in any other part of the world. Therefore, agricultural products will flood our markets and will cause the upset of this policy. Therefore, what the people do is to demand embargoes against agricultural materials, and that means that our whole foreign economic policy is unworkable.

It was only when we had gone a considerable distance on thinking in terms of pure economic policy that those of us who had charge of the thing discovered we were tackled very hard, and we weren't sure whether we had a broken leg or merely a sprained one, but we found ourselves on the ground and the whole farm block was on top of us. The last instance of that was at Geneva. Mr. Clayton was making good headway with the charter of the International Trade Organization. They had some seventy or eighty trade agreements under negotiation, when suddenly the Australians said, "Are you going to reduce the tariff on wool?" And we said, "Of course, we have always intended to do that. We are a wool importing country. We produce a third to a half of our wool, but we have to import the rest. Therefore a tariff makes no sense and we are going to reduce it." We just got to that happy thought when we discovered the Congress of the United States, both houses, had passed a bill which was going to raise the tariff on wool about fifty percent over a very high existing tariff. Mr. Clayton flew back across the Atlantic Ocean, and we had a very critical time. The President vetoed the bill. We had discussions in Congress, and we finally worked out a result by which Congress is subsidizing the wool growers and
we have not raised but are, I hope, going to lower the tariff.

That entrenched national domestic policy, the support of agriculture prices, is a fundamental limitation on the formulation of foreign policy. You must formulate your foreign policy with that in mind. If you do not do it, it is going to be frustrated.

Closely allied to it is the whole tariff question, which again is a deep-seated American policy, and it grew out of the period of our being a debtor nation. It made comparatively little difference in those days whether we had a high tariff. We were being industrialized. We were not the great exporting nation of the world that we have now become. In order to meet that ingrained domestic policy, Mr. Hull developed his trade agreement program. The trade agreement program is designed by a selective process to have agreements between two countries which will reduce tariffs on items where they are obviously too high. That is about the only way a breach could be made in that wall. It is very interesting to see the results of that on actual foreign policy.

We discussed with all the United Nations how we were to go about reviving international trade. They said reduce tariffs. We said, fine, that is first rate. They said, let’s everybody reduce tariffs by a percentage, or if some are higher than others, we will have another method, but everyone will make a flat reduction of the tariffs. It took us months and months and months to explain to them that we could not do that. We could only do it by legislation, and we could no more get legislation than fly. Therefore, we said, we will conduct with all of you simultaneously a series of bi-lateral trade negotiations, with the most favored nation clause in it, so in effect we will be reducing our tariffs, but we will do
it by making a deal with the British on items of which they are the principal importers and the French and the Belgians will profit by that. We will make a deal with the French on champagnes and wine and everyone else will profit from that, and so on. These Europeans said, "You must be crazy. This is the most complicated, the most confused way of reducing tariffs that we can imagine." We said, "Maybe we are crazy but we are not individually crazy. The whole country is crazy." Therefore, to make any sort of a dent in the practically prohibitive tariffs we had in this country, we have to go through that very complicated arrangement.

Then there is another series of limiting factors on the formulation of foreign policy. This one is hard to describe, and I put down here a name which will make it even more difficult for you to understand. This limitation is called the "Doctor's Dilemma or Why Diplomats become Diplomaniacs." This has to do with two conflicting apparent necessities in our life in this country. One necessity is there must be almost complete agreement in the United States before any foreign policy is effective. You cannot adopt a foreign policy by a fifty-one percent vote in the United States. It just won't work. It won't work for a great many reasons which I will mention briefly.

What you have to do in this country is get a program or a policy to the point where two-thirds or three-fourths agree with it. Then it has a modicum of success. Why do you have to have that high degree of unanimity? You have to have that on account of our legislative processes. In the first place, they take a great deal of time. Take the Marshall Plan. We start with a statement by the Secretary of State in June, and that is discussed. People say we don't know quite what it means yet but it sounds
all right. Then you have the meeting in Paris and that crystallizes this suggestion into more concrete terms. Then the President sends a message to Congress and Secretary Marshall goes up and addresses the committees on both sides. Then you say, this is going to take a long time, and you split the program into two bills, an interim aid bill and a long-term bill. The interim aid begins with an authorization act. You have all the difficulty of appearing before two committees of Congress. There are long debates in both houses which finally pass the interim organization.

But you are nowhere yet. You have only started. You go back to different committees and different men who have not heard any of this discussion and who during this time have been committing themselves to some other attitude of approach, and you have to get the money from them. When you get the money to last until the thirty-first of March, you have spent enough effort to run a steamship twenty-five times around the world at twenty-five miles an hour.

Then you start all over in January with the same procedure, an authorization and then appropriations for the long-term program. What Congress will probably do is say we will give you the money for one year, come back to us next year. That means that American foreign policy month after month, and year after year is up to be shot at like a sitting duck. Therefore, if you do not start cut with a vast body of opinion behind you, the program will fall sometime along the way. If you go into the Marshall Plan by a narrow squeak vote in the first place, you do not give the sense of conviction to the countries of Europe that they are going to be seen through the period of their difficulty. The people administering it do not have the real conviction that when the interim money runs out other
money will be available and so forth.

So successful foreign policies in the United States are those which have a great preponderance of opinion. When you get a thing like the United Nations charter with only two votes against in the Senate and practically no one against it in the country, that is the kind of policy which has a chance of success. The very narrow margin ones are likely to fall by the wayside. So, as I say, you have to have this strong body of approval.

But there is another underlying reality in American life. The chief way we know about affairs is through the newspapers and over the radio. Those are our media of communication, mass communication in the United States. Of course, there are magazines and there are books, but taking the one hundred forty million people, a very small fraction gets ideas through books and magazines, and a very large number get them through these great media. What is the underlying necessity of these media? What is news? Agreement isn't news. You don't put a great streamer across the paper "Truman and Vandenbarg Have Pleasant Talk." That isn't news. The thing that is news is "Marshall Flails Molotov" or somebody reaps somebody else. That makes news. So controversy is news and news is controversy. The things go back and forth.

How does that affect the formulation of foreign policy? It affects it very deeply. In order to carry the country with you those in charge of the job in the State Department have to be thinking all the time of putting out as much information, speaking as openly as they can, meeting with church groups and labor groups and business groups, going to this, that and the other meeting, going to the American Legion or whatever it
may be. You are continually presenting to the country the policy that you think it should follow.

All the time you are doing that, the press in order to make it interesting is trying to get some kind of a conflict or controversy out of it, and one very good way to do that is to have a premature disclosure. Everyone who has worked in foreign policy knows that before any subject is ready to be talked about with any group of people you have to have quite a long period of confidential dealings, whether it is the United Nations charter at Dumbarton Oaks or whether it is putting together the British and American zones in Germany. We just couldn't have an idea one morning in the State Department that it would be a fine idea to combine the two zones, and immediately call a press conference and say so. What you have to do is get in touch with the British and see what they think about it. You then don't want to come out with it and have the French read it in the newspapers. You have to talk with the French. Then you have a problem whether you want to say anything to the Russians, whether they shall read it in the paper or not. You have to make up your mind whether the Russians will use this information or not. What I am getting at is there must be a confidential period here where all of this is being discussed in confidential terms.

There are two things that will appeal to any good newspaper man. One thing is if he can find out about something and print it he has gotten what he calls a scoop. The scoop used to be that you were the first man to print the news. It is now that you print the news before it happens. That is a scoop. So if anyone of these people can discover that something is going on he announces it has happened — "United States and British Zones
may be. You are continually presenting to the country the policy that you think it should follow.

All the time you are doing this, the press in order to make it interesting is trying to get some kind of a conflict or controversy out of it, and one very good way to do that is to have a premature disclosure. Everyone who has worked in foreign policy knows that before any subject is ready to be talked about with any group of people you have to have quite a long period of confidential dealings, whether it is the United Nations charter at Dumbarton Oaks or whether it is putting together the British and American zones in Germany. We just couldn't have an idea one morning in the State Department that it would be a fine idea to combine the two zones, and immediately call a press conference and say so. What you have to do is get in touch with the British and see what they think about it. You then don't want to come out with it and have the French read it in the newspapers. You have to talk with the French. Then you have a problem whether you want to say anything to the Russians, whether they shall read it in the paper or not. You have to make up your mind whether the Russians will use this information or not. What I am getting at is that there must be a confidential period here where all of this is being discussed in confidential terms.

There are two things that will appeal to any good newspaper man. One thing is if he can find out about something and print it he has gotten what he calls a scoop. The scoop used to be that you were the first man to print the news. It is now that you print the news before it happens. That is a scoop. So if anyone of these people can discover that something is going on he announces it has happened — "United States and British Zones
Put Together." Immediately everybody gets mad and everybody accuses his
colleague of having leaked. You say to the British, "Doggone you fellows,
you can't be trusted one inch. Here you have leaked this thing." They
say, "We never leak. We fired the Chancellor of the Exchequer because he
leaked. But we know everybody in Washington leaks. It is a permanent
sieve." Usually in the course of that somebody denounces someone. That
is a fine story and that is all printed.

So you find that you have started on a policy which is very
delicate at this point, a policy in which you must get a great preponderance
of agreement, and you start right out with a row at the beginning of it.
And so it goes all the way through, row after row after row. Now that is
a limiting factor. You have no idea how limiting it is. You know, on the
one hand that just as soon as you possibly can you must go to the American
people with full, convincing and popular discussions of the most complicated
subjects. On the other hand, you have to be as secret as the grave until
you are ready to put the thing out. As you go along the problem gets more
and more difficult.

One thing which is sure to cause intense trouble is to have any
of the leaders in the House and Senate read about an important announce-
ment in the newspapers. They are against it at once if that happens. So
you must go and tell them about it. If you tell them long enough for them
to go to the newspapers, they are going to go to the newspapers and get
some credit with the reporters. And there it is all in the papers.

So you have to walk a tight rope here, on the one hand knowing
you are going to make an enemy if you are too secretive, and on the other
knowing you are going to get into trouble if you are not. And that, as I
say, is the reason diplomats become dipsomaniacs. It is exactly the reason sometimes, because when a reporter has something, you hope, always futilely, that you can stop him printing, you call him up and say, "Joe, come over and have a drink with me."

Then there is another limiting factor I should like to mention, and that is the problem of executive management. The great unsolved problem of the executive branch of the United States government is how to carry on policy management and policy execution at the top. The office of the President is the greatest executive office in the world. The President has very great power. No President that I know of yet has solved — and this is no criticism of any President — the great task of transforming the office of the President into an institution. It isn't just one man sitting in the White House. It must be one man with a lot of other men who are able to take all of these operating vice-presidents, the needs of all of the departments of the government, pull them together, take a decision and see that the decision is carried out. That has not yet been solved. Mr. Hoover's commission is working on it, and I think Mr. Hoover recognizes it is the most baffling of all problems.

Sometimes it is said that we can do this through the cabinet if we had a cabinet secretary. That I am sure isn't the case. It isn't true. The word "cabinet" as a description of the heads of the American departments is a complete misnomer. We have taken over a British word, we have taken over a conception from England where there is collective responsibility, where the members of the cabinet are the leading members of the House of Commons and in some cases the House of Lords, and they are the chief and dominant people in the dominant political party, and we have applied that
to a group of men who are really operating vice presidents, who have very little, if any, political stature of their own. They may be outstanding men in the country but as political figures they do not have any great standing of their own. They are there because the President has chosen them, not because they are the people who as in England can be elected and can influence the House of Commons. So it isn't true that with a cabinet secretary we are going to make this headway. It is through developing the institution of the Presidency.

Why is that a limiting factor in foreign policy. It is in this way: It is easy to make a decision in foreign policy; it is very, very difficult to carry it out. Let's take a simple one about which there is no real difference of opinion. It was decided in '46 after the crop failures in the Far East and in Europe that the United States would export an unprecedented amount of grain to keep the world from starving, and we did. We started in and we began shipping a colossal amount. Over a million tons of grain a month were being shipped. And that caused trouble. In the first place, it caused trouble about boxcars. We had to take all the boxcars away from other uses to bring wheat from interior points to the seaboard. That meant that all sorts of things that people were expecting, automobiles, parts for machinery and factories, iceboxes, washing machines, lawnmowers, could not be delivered. People who were unanimous in the idea that if the world was starving to death we should send wheat for them to eat were not unanimous that they wanted to postpone the icebox indefinitely in order to do this. So we had a tremendous backfire in the country and in the Congress. That part of our government, the Office of Defense Transportation, which was charged with the duty of transporting the wheat, said, "We are overdoing
All we could do was argue with Mr. Johnson and nothing happened. The State Department said one thing and Mr. Johnson said another. So we had to go over and bother the President, and the President had to listen to this argument. Then he said, "What I shall do is set up a cabinet committee on food. We will have the Secretaries of State, Commerce, Agriculture, Mr. Johnson from the Office of Defense Transportation, and Mr. Steelman as the umpire. You refer all questions to them." So we referred this question and it was finally hammered out.

Then the thing went along pretty well for a while, and very shortly it was discovered there wasn't any more wheat in the elevators. That was very serious. The Department of Agriculture went out and tried to buy wheat, and no wheat. So they reported that the reason for this was that the farmers in the small towns and in the small elevators were not sending their wheat to the large concentration points. Very well, how to make them do that? Raise the price of wheat. So the State Department in our enthusiasm, and I think rightly so, argued that we ought to offer a bonus of thirty cents on all wheat delivered in a certain period. Over the intense objection of the Department of Agriculture that was done, and many of the things that the Department of Agriculture thought would happen, did happen. The thing that we thought would happen also did happen. We got the wheat. They also got a tremendous marketing of animals which they didn't want. As the price of wheat went up and upset the ratio between the price of hogs and beef, people marketed the beef. It also hit us with a
terrible sideswipe in day-old chicks, which you wouldn't think was a matter of foreign policy. I got covered with day-old chicks before I got through with this thing.

Those are all problems which affect the execution of foreign policy, questions which involved in this case four departments of the government. In order to have daily operating decisions, the only thing you could do was to improvise a cabinet group which sat under an umpire, and every time the fighting really got tough we had to interrupt what the President was doing and make him umpire the bout between one or two of the departments. So administration is a limiting factor in foreign policy, and you are going to see it very interestingly illustrated within the next few months.

There is great pressure, I think successful pressure, to have the entire setup for the domestic operation of the Marshall Plan in an agency outside of the State Department. The foreign part of the program is going to be carried out, I am afraid, through a system so utterly complicated that nobody can understand it. There will be phrases which say that everyone is to operate under the foreign policy as laid down by the Secretary of State. I experienced that all through the war. Henry Wallace and the men were supposed to operate under policy laid down by the Secretary of State, which means they told us to go to hell daily and there wasn't anybody to umpire the row. That is going to be a very serious factor, and it is a limiting factor.

It means you cannot do exactly what you want to do. It means that what ultimately happens will bear only a general resemblance to what you started out to do. I might say when the bill is passed you can put in the front of it one of these notices you have in novels, "Any resemblance
between the Marshall Plan and this bill is purely coincidental."

Now to bind this all up let me take one matter which was decided, a matter of foreign policy, and show how some -- perhaps all if I can remember them -- of these various limiting factors operated in the formulation of this decision. The matter I have in mind is the application of economic sanctions to Japan in 1941. That was a very important and a very difficult series of decisions. The first thing to note about it was that we had in the country, sometimes in the same people, two conflicting moods. One mood growing out of our deep underlying interest in China and our intense dislike for dictators and bullies was to favor every kind of restriction on scrap iron, on petroleum, on cotton, on everything. The same people either on the same day or on another day would say, don't you get us into war. We are not going to get into the war. We are going to have nothing to do with this war. So they would blackguard you on one side because you were an appeaser and weak, and if you took any sort of a step they said you are getting us into war, you are a warmonger, you are very bad. So you had these two moods underlined.

Then you had a very confused and complicated administrative system. Export control was operated in this way: The State Department issued the pieces of paper which the exporter gave to the Collector of Customs to take something out of the United States. Those were written in the State Department, stamped and handed to him. But the policy was not supposed to be made in the State Department. That was made by General Maxwell who was the Administrator of Export Control. So General Maxwell gave the State Department its directives and the State Department issued the orders. But it was very clear to the State Department that these directives that General Maxwell
gave were really the most important decisions of foreign policy. So, by a side agreement with General Maxwell, it was understood that we in the State Department told General Maxwell what to tell us, and he told us, and then we issued a paper.

You can see if there were only Mr. Hull and General Maxwell that might work, but when you had three thousand people in each camp we were often told something which we hadn't told General Maxwell to tell us. He regarded that as a foul ball. So we would get into difficulty in deciding what and when, as far as export licenses were concerned.

Then when you got down to the merits of the problem you had a situation with which many of the officers in this room are familiar. The services said to the State Department, we all understand that we are dealing with a potential enemy and probably not too distantly potential at that. Therefore what we are interested in doing is weakening the potential of that enemy as much as possible. But on the other hand, we are not in very good shape from the military point of view in the Far East, and therefore don't let us go so fast that we precipitate anything. That was rather hard advice to follow out. If you denied something which was unimportant, that was silly, that didn't accomplish anything. If you denied something that was really important, then obviously the Japanese did some figuring about it and you didn't know what they were doing.

This went along for quite a while. Finally in July 1941 a paper was drawn up which had some alternatives for action, at least they were supposed to be alternatives by the men who drew them up. They were considered by the President and his advisers and he marked one which was "Freeze Japanese Assets." In effect that decision comprehend all the other so-called
alternatives. Those of us who were given this to administer were puzzled at the start. We didn't know whether we were to do everything which the phrase might cover or whether those who decided thought it was a limited decision. At any rate when we issued the freezing order for Japan on the 26th of July 1941 all it meant and said was from then on anything which left the United States for Japan required a license, any dealings with any Japanese bank account in the United States required a license. But it did not necessarily mean that these transactions could not occur. It meant that one had to get permission to engage in them.

We all asked for instructions how we were to proceed and those instructions were not ready for us. At any rate we didn't get them. So on the day the President signed this order we who were administering it did not know what we were supposed to do in the next few days. Then occurred one of the most amazing acts.

The day after this order was issued, the 23rd of July 1941, every Japanese ship in the world turned around and went to Japan and stayed there. There was one ship about a hundred miles off California with some Americans on board which came to the edge of the three mile limit but would not come in, and we sent some tugs out and transferred the Americans to them, and then the ship went back to Japan. So the Japanese blockaded themselves. We didn't blockade them. We didn't deny export licenses. There wasn't a single application for a license made. Nothing happened for three weeks. Every ship went to its port and stayed there. The totally unexpected thing the other fellow does is another limiting factor which I have not mentioned. You think out what he is going to do, and he rarely does that, he usually does something quite different.

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During the two weeks the country came to the conclusion that we were refusing any sort of economic dealings with Japan. That was an error. We hadn't been asked, we didn't know. But the firm conviction in the country went out that that was happening. And as that became more and more clear in editorials and otherwise it made a greater impact upon the administration in charge of the policy. It made it almost impossible to do anything else.

At that point the Japanese financial attaché came around to me and said, "There is a tanker that we have somewhere in South America which is going back to Japan. Would you let it save a cargo of fuel oil if it came to the United States." This was not gasoline but fuel oil. Fuel oil was not subject to embargo or license at any prior time. It was just plain, simple, ordinary fuel oil. That was a difficult one to answer. So we had a happy inspiration. I said, "Well, I don't think we can consider that question on the merits at this point because the day before the President issued his freezing order the Japanese naval attaché withdrew seven million dollars in cash from an account in a bank in Washington and he has that cash. Now, we take a dim view of that. We think that was an attempt to circumvent the order of the President. Therefore, if you will instruct him to deposit that cash in the bank, then we will consider your application and act on it, and we hope in a proper way." That was fine. That got me off the hook for a few minutes.

He went back to the Embassy and then he came down later on and he said, "That seems to be a very fair proposition and so far as the Ambassador is concerned and the civil government in Japan we would be glad to do it. But the Japanese system is different from the American system. The civil
government in Japan cannot issue orders to the Japanese navy. We cannot
order them to redeposit this money." So Mr. Hull said, "All right, no
tickete, no laundry."

There is one other factor I ought to put in here and that is so
far I have been describing what we knew when we made decisions. We were
fully aware of the seriousness of this decision. We were torn and I am
sure General Marshall and Admiral King were torn as to what was the right
step to take, and finally it was decided this one was. We know now what
we did not know then, that before this decision was ever made, very con-
siderably before it was ever made, the Japanese had reached the decision
that they were going to precipitate an attack upon the United States.
They had not decided when. They had not decided all the details. But
what is now coming out in the war trials in Tokyo makes it perfectly
clear our worry that we might precipitate something was quite unfounded
because they had already decided to do that. But you don’t know it when
you are making decisions.

I have tried to run through these limiting factors and illustrate
some of them with concrete facts and important decisions, and, if it is
Admiral Hill’s wish, I shall be very glad to answer any questions that
anybody would like to ask me.
Discussion following lecture on
FORMULATION OF POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
by
Dean Acheson

Presented at
The National War College
Washington, D. C.
16 December 1947

RESTRICTED
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CAPTAIN KANE: I note the columnist you referred to, Mr. Acheson, came out this morning with an article in which he stated he didn’t think the system we used in the Council of Foreign Ministers permits enough confidential dealing, and therefore advocates going back to what I think is the old system of the diplomatic approach and so forth. Would you care to comment on that?

MR. ACHESON: I think the system of the Council of Foreign Ministers has fulfilled any usefulness it had. One of the great difficulties with that system was that it took all the time of the Secretary of State and the heads of the other foreign offices and many of their most important subordinates. I suffered from that a good deal. Mr. Byrnes, I think, in his book said he was Secretary of State for 650 days, only two hundred and ten of which he was in Washington. I knew that very well. The expenditure of high-grade ability was out of all proportion to the results obtained, and I think the general formulation and conduct of policy in the United States suffered by the absence of the Secretary of State and by any of his chief subordinates who had to be cooped up for weeks and weeks while you went through those delaying tactics that the Russians put in.

We will say, of course, that no one could have known that at the start. It wasn’t contemplated at all that they would spend eight or ten weeks and then get nowhere. The idea was they would have deputies
who would meet continuously and they would work out the satellite treaties, the Austrian treaty and the German treaty, and only the most important questions would be reserved for the meeting of the heads of the foreign offices.

But I think it is true now that the time has come for conserving the time and energy of the Secretary of State so he can stay here and attend to his job and not be wasting a lot of time out of Washington.

MR. WILKELIN: Mr. Acheson, I recall your reference to apparently conflicting plans as to the best means of implementing this European recovery program, and I regret to say a number of my distinguished colleagues here in uniform have manifested a certain doubt in reference to the Department of State to supervise and implement such a program, and are inclined to recommend or support some such independent agency as is proposed, for example, in the Harriman Report. I wonder if you would comment on some of the aspects of the implementation of the program by ourselves and other countries participating?

MR. ACHESON: I had better do this in an entirely personal way because I understand the decisions have been made, and I propose to support the decisions that have been made, although I don't agree with them altogether. So pretending they haven't been made, and I am not criticizing anyone in the government, I think the decisions again are reached not altogether on the merits of the problem but because of necessity. There is an attitude of mind in Congress which is very similar to that you described as existing among some of your colleagues here, which would make it quite
impossible to put it in the State Department.

There are several factors which you have to have in mind in deciding how you are going to set up an organization. One is the dealings abroad with the countries involved. The second one is making the agreements, whether made in Washington or abroad, with the countries involved. There is the domestic administration of the program, and that has to be split into two parts. One is the actual procurement of goods, and the other is deciding what you are going to get and where it is going to go.

It seems to me not impossible because it happened all through the war, but very undesirable to have two groups of people reporting to two different sources in Washington representing the United States abroad. That happened all through the war and it led to very great confusion. The EK, after the FIA, had its own people abroad. We struggled for years and years to try to get those people brought into our missions, and the results were always unsatisfactory. They ultimately were brought in under their own chiefs, and they maintained a separate administrative system. They were paid differently from other people, and our chief of mission had only a very light hand over them. They were always getting up ideas which were imaginative in all right except they didn't fit the country where they were being carried out. A man would be sent to Spain or Portugal who knew nothing about Spain or Portugal. An idea which might be all right in Sweden wasn't any good in Spain. It took us a long time and a lot of energy was spent on that.

Furthermore you have to consider what you do in foreign countries. I think nothing could be more ill-advised than to have Americans try to
administer any of the activities of the foreign countries. I don't think you ought to have American trustees of bank accounts in the Banks of France and Italy into which local currency proceeds are paid. What we must do, if the whole purpose of this program is to succeed, is to build up the independence and the strength of the nations with whom we are dealing. We will not succeed in doing that if we take both authority and responsibility away from the governments. Therefore, what we need abroad are observers and not administrators.

Somebody says suppose wheat gets into the black market. The answer, of course it will get into the black market. Of course it will and stop worrying about it. The black market is a result and not a cause, and as long as there is a deficiency of wheat there will be a black market in France and Italy and all the Americans in the world can't change it. We have to stop worrying about it.

Similarly there is an idea that we should have people who will control the finances of the governments abroad. That makes no sense at all, you pay all the local currency proceeds of all the American goods into a bank account and have Americans administer that, the Central Bank of France in Italy could circumvent the whole business by making new loans to the state at the back door. So what we should understand at the start is we are trying to make these governments different from or better than they are. I am sure the State Department can get adequate people who will observe and report what is going on. We ought to do everything in our power to put the responsibility of achieving the goals stated in the Paris program on the nations concerned and not on the American administrator.
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So far as the agreements with the countries are concerned I feel very strongly that those are so much a vital part of our foreign policy that they should be made by the Secretary of State and by people working with him in the State Department who are thoroughly familiar with the current situation in each one of the countries concerned. I think these agreements ought to be over-all agreements by which we reserve as our sanction the right to stop, if we think the country is not doing what it should. They should not be detailed ones which spell out that a country on a certain date must or must not do this or that with rations, strikes, the financial system, taxes or whatever it may be. We cannot treat France and Italy the way we treat Greece.

There are a couple of functions on the domestic side which don't belong in the Department of State and nobody would consider putting them there. For instance, the whole control of exports and control of priorities that is now in the Department of Commerce and it can be managed there perfectly well. Not a great deal will be necessary in that connection, but what is necessary can be done in the Department of Commerce. The actual procurement of the goods ought to be in the departments which are procuring that type of goods. Most of it will be in the Department of Agriculture and in the Department of Commerce. That that leaves in the administrative office is not unlike what the lend-lease office was in the war. It is an office which has a great big checkbook and it can reimburse the other departments for what is being done. That is, it has the responsibility of screening the various requests.
I should have the Department of State get all the advice and
up it can get from the Department of Commerce, but I would leave the
ower and the control to the Department of State. If it is somewhere else
sure you will find policies being carried out which are perfectly good
ies from the point of view of the administrator but from the over-all
nt of view of the United States interests will not be.

Let me give one illustration. For a long while the Foreign Liquida-
mission was not in the Department of State. It was loosely
iliated at one time with the War Department and then in the War Assets
mination. The man who was running that office as a separate office
one desire in mind, and that was to get the most money he could from
 purchaser who wanted surplus property. Then you put it in the Depart-
 of State it was perfectly clear to us that the exact opposite policy
 the right policy. If you took all the ready dollars that Australia
 and in return for the surplus property, all you did was create an acute
 financial problem which you had to solve. So there was no point in taking
 all their dollars away one day and sending them some the next day. So we
 said, if we don’t want the property in the United States, where can it be
 est usefully put from the point of view of our foreign policy? If it
 as with the Australians, we made a deal whereby they used it for certain
 purposes. They did various things which they could do without losing
 dollars.

I have made a long answer to your question, but I think it is
 entirely possible and practical if political considerations were different

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to have this thing in the Department of State. I would have it head up to the Secretary, not through anybody else. And since the office of the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs is vacant, I would appoint someone to that office who would be the administrator of this program. He would have the advantage of all the help and advice of the Department of State because he would have direct access to the Secretary.

GENERAL LEIGHTON: One of the most perplexing problems, and one that has been raised frequently in this college is the question of educating the American people, and it still is a problem. No one has ever answered it successfully. I wonder if you would tell us your views on how to approach the problem. How do you think we should?

MR. ACHESON: It has to be approached in many ways. The best way is for people who know about a matter to go out and speak in the country. And, as I say, I have just been out for two weeks, and one of the most interesting things to me was that you do not have to talk down to people in the United States. They don't want to have you go out and play on their emotions. They understand that Russia is the background of all of these difficulties, but you don't have to go out and beat the tom-tom and tell them everyone is going communist tomorrow. What they want to know is about the economics of Western Europe. Why is it that after all the help we have given Western Europe it still isn't on its feet. The moment they understand the basic economics of that part of the world they understand the problem. They understand it very clearly.

Another interesting thing that I found out, and which I hesitate
To mention with Dr. Colonel here, is that the best people to talk to on this subject, the ones you get the most response from, are not the councils on foreign relations and foreign policy associations. There is a curious madness in those groups around the country. I shall deny this if I am ever quoted. They overintellectualize everything. They meet together and get these ideas back and forth, but you don’t get the feeling that anybody in the room is ever going to do anything. But I spoke to four thousand people from the iron ranges in Duluth on this subject and we had a good meeting and they asked a whole lot of questions. There were some of these left-wing isolationists there and there was a little rioting about that, but it was full of life and everybody was on their toes. When we got through with this a man got up and said, “I have heard all this. The question is to do something. We have a lot of young ladies in the back of this room and each one has a pile of petitions to Congress, and you fellows go and sign those.” They got about three thousand. They want to do something. They don’t want just intellectualizing.

I think that is indispensable, and the Department of State ought to make an effort that everybody in the place has to make a certain number of speeches, and I would make them on what they call out west the knife and fork circuits, the Lions Club, the Kiwanis, and not in the more highbrow places.

Then, of course, there is the whole business of the radio speeches that are made, and that is very important. I think the Department did a good job for some years on those Saturday night radio programs where we tried to discuss things back and forth. The Department also can do even more...
than it is now doing in working with various groups. Francis Russell is
doing a fine job but he could extend that if he had some more money. He
has conferences every quarter of church groups, labor groups, business
people, these foreign affairs councils. They all come to Washington and
people talk with them and they get ideas that way. Out west a lot of people
will say, "How can we get literature. We want literature on this point."
That the Department ought to be doing, and is doing to some extent, is have
pamphlets written in clear form, and not have phrases like "mutually inter-
dependent" and "beneficial trade," have them straightforward talks, and
have those available so if a labor union wants a thousand they can get it
and distribute it, or the Chamber of Commerce. But the Department has to
get right down with people and make them realize that it is a human insti-
tution made up of very hardworking people who strange to say, rather know
something about what they are talking about.

ADIRAL HILL: I am sorry, sir, our time seems to have run out,
but I do thank you very much for this talk you have given this morning.
I think you have been extremely helpful in giving the limitations and the
trials and tribulations and the headaches that go with not only making a
policy but trying to maintain it and make it effective for the best interests
of the United States. I think we are very fortunate in getting someone
like you down to discuss that and outline it for us. Thank you very much.